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FLOODING THE POSSIBILITY OF RECOVERY UNDER A
TEMPORARY TAKINGS ANALYSIS: THE DROWNING
EFFECTS OF ARKANSAS GAME & FISH
COMMISSION V UNITED STATES

I.

INTRODUCTION

When the states ratified the Bill of Rights on December 15,
1791, the drafters of the Fifth Amendment could not have predicted the flood of varied, and at times inconsistent, jurisprudence
that has since attempted to interpret the precise meaning of the
amendment's final clause: "[N]or shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation."' This clause allows a
landowner to bring several types of takings claims against the federal government depending on whether the deprivation of private
property is physical or regulatory, permanent or temporary. 2 If the
government deprives a landowner of its property in any way, takings
jurisprudence requires the3 government to pay just compensation to
the aggrieved landowner.
A particularly severe type of governmental taking involves public works projects, specifically the construction and maintenance of
dams by the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps).4 Landowners typically redress such takings by bringing inverse condemnation proceedings against the government after the alleged taking occurs.5
The landowner may institute an inverse condemnation proceeding
when the government takes a flowage easement over the landowner's property and refuses payment of just compensation. 6
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (articulating takings clause). For a brief discussion of general takings jurisprudence, see infra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
2. For a brief background of the different types of takings claims, see infra
notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
3. For a brief background of takings jurisprudence, see infra notes 65-74 and
accompanying text.
4. For a further discussion of Corps navigational projects' takings, see generally infra notes 78-98 and accompanying text. The Corps has general jurisdiction
over both the navigable waters within the United States, which includes all major
bodies of water such as rivers, lakes and streams, and also the smaller bodies of
water with a "significant nexus" to navigable waters. See Rapanos v. United States,
547 U.S. 715, 716-19 (2006) (describing Army Corps of Engineers' jurisdiction).
5. For a further discussion of inverse condemnation proceedings, see infra
notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
6. For a further discussion of inverse condemnation proceedings, see infra
notes 72-74 and accompanying text. The Corps in Little Rock, Arkansas describes
flowage easements as giving the "government the perpetual right to flood privately
owned land, if necessary, for operation of the project and to prohibit any struc-
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The federal government's appropriation of flowage easements
over private property can have numerous environmental consequences on the landowner's property.7 These effects include: timber mortality, soil erosion, invasion of new wetland species, and
decreased wildlife populations. 8 If a landowner does not receive
just compensation from the government for the taking of both the
property and the vegetation situated upon it, the landowner may
have difficulty funding the regeneration costs necessary to restore
the property to its natural ecological state.9
In 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit addressed a case involving the Corps' appropriation of a
flowage easement over the Arkansas Game & Fish Commission's
(Commission) Wildlife Management Area.' 0 Arkansas Game & Fish
Commission v. United States (Arkansas Game & Fish)II represents the
Federal Circuit's attempt to resolve the vast jurisprudence of flowage easement takings with a focus on defining the distinction between temporary and permanent floods. 12 This distinction is
particularly significant because it dictates whether the court engages in a tort or takings analysis, as only a valid claim under a

takings analysis elicits just compensation for the aggrieved land-

tures for human habitation." Shoreline Management, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS,
LIT-rLE ROCK DIST., http://www.swl.usace.army.mil/parks/dardanelle/shoreline.
htm (last updated Mar. 2, 2010) (defining flowage easements); see also FlowageEasement, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, JIM CHAPMAN LAKE/COOPER DAM, http://www.
swf-wc.usace.army.mil/cooper/Realestate/Flowage%20Easement.asp (last updated
July 19, 2007) [hereinafter Flowage Easement] (defining flowage easement). The
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers website states:
Flowage easement land is privately owned land on which the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers has acquired certain perpetual rights. Namely the
right to flood it in connection with the operation of a reservoir; the right
to prohibit construction or maintenance of ariy structure for human
habitation; the right to approve all other structures constructed on flowage easement land, except fencing.
Flowage Easement, supra.
7. For a discussion of the adverse environmental effects of repeated governmental flooding, including timber mortality and invasion of new wetland species,
see infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
8. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States (Ark. Game & Fish II), 637
F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (discussing environmental consequences of excess flooding in area).
9. For an example of the regeneration costs associated with restoring land
destroyed by a flood, see infra note 62.
10. Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1378-79 (holding intermittent flooding
did not amount to temporary taking compensable under Fifth Amendment).
11. 637 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
12. For a further summary of the Federal Circuit's analysis in Arkansas Game
& Fish, see infra notes 126-168 and accompanying text.
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owner's appropriated property.13 Moreover, only "intermittent"
and "inevitably recurring" temporary floods are eligible for recovery
under a temporary takings analysis. 14 The determination of what
qualifies as a valid and compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment, therefore, is an extremely important and delicate task.1 5
The Federal Circuit's narrow holding in Arkansas Game & Fish
ignored the longstanding precedent establishing the availability of
recovery under a temporary takings analysis. 16 Instead, the court
concluded subsequent releases of water and deviations from Clearwater Dam's Water Control Manual (Manual) did not recur, and
thus the floods were "only temporary."' 7 Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit determined the Corps had not taken a flowage easement
over the Commission's land.1 8
This Note examines the Federal Circuit's analysis in Arkansas
Game & Fish in light of the long-standing governmental takings jurisprudence and predicts the effect of its inconsistent holding on
future flowage easement cases. 19 Part II summarizes the facts of Arkansas Game & Fish.20 Part III outlines the evolution of Fifth
Amendment takings jurisprudence with a focus on inverse condemnation cases arising from aqueous governmental takings of property.2 ' Part IV examines the legal analysis utilized by the Federal
13. For a further examination of the tort and takings distinction, see infra
notes 99-118 and accompanying text.
14. Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1376 (quoting Ridge Line Inc. v. United
States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003)) (describing types of flooding eligible
for recovery under temporary takings theory). For a further discourse of intermittent and inevitably recurring floods, see infra notes 75-87 and accompanying text.
15. For an analysis of the inconsistent interpretations of what qualifies as a
Fifth Amendment taking, see infra notes 79-124 and accompanying text.
16. For a further summary of the Federal Circuit's analysis, see infra notes
128-162 and accompanying text.
17. See Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d 1366, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (discussing temporary nature of deviations from Clearwater Dam's Water Control
Manual).
18. Id. at 1379 (holding Corps did not take compensable flowage easement
over Commission's land).
19. For a narrative analysis of Arkansas Game & Fish, see infra notes 126-168
and accompanying text. For a critical analysis of the court's holding in Arkansas
Game & Fish, see infra notes 169-216 and accompanying text. For an exploration
of the potential impact Arkansas Game & Fishwill have on subsequent takings jurisprudence, see infra notes 217-246 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the relevant facts of Arkansas Game & Fish, see infra
notes 25-64 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of relevant background material pertaining to Fifth
Amendment takings analysis and inverse condemnation cases arising from governmental takings of flowage easements, see infra notes 65-125 and accompanying
text.
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Circuit to reach its holding.2 2 Part V compares the Federal Circuit's
rationale and procedure to prior Federal Circuit decisions.2 3 Finally, Part VI considers the impact of Arkansas Game & Fish on fu-

ture inverse condemnation takings cases.2 4
II.

FACTS

In Arkansas Game & Fish, the Federal Circuit considered
whether the Corps took a temporary flowage easement over the
Commission's property, thereby entitling the Commission to just
compensation from the federal government.2 5 The controversy
arose from a Corps-approved, seven-year period of interim deviations from Clearwater Dam's established water release rates. 26 The
deviations caused extensive flooding and timber mortality throughout the Commission's Dave Donaldson Black River Wildlife Management Area (Management Area).27 The Commission acquired
the Management Area in 1957.28 It encompasses 23,000 acres devoted to wildlife preservation, hunting, and timber harvesting along
the Black River in northeast Arkansas.29 The Commission preserves
the Management Area in order to maintain a diverse bottomland
22. For a narrative analysis of the court's decision in Arkansas Game & Fish,
see infra notes 126-168 and accompanying text.
23. For a critical analysis of the Federal Circuit's holding in Arkansas Game &
Fish, see infra notes 169-216 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the impact of the Federal Circuit's holding in Arkansas
Game & Fish, see infra notes 217-246 and accompanying text.
25. See Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d 1366, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (describing
central issue of case). "The Claims court concluded [ ] the United States had
taken a temporary flowage easement over the Commission's property and awarded
a total of $5,778,757.90 in damages." Id. "The United States appealed, contending
that no taking had occurred, and that if it had, the damages were overstated." Id.
at 1374. The Commission cross-appealed, claiming they were entitled to additional damages for timber regeneration costs. Id.
26. See id. at 1367 (revealing Corps' deviation from Water Control Manual).
The Clearwater Dam is "located in southeast Missouri approximately 115 miles
upstream of the Commission's Management Area," which is located in northeast
Arkansas. Id.
27. See id. at 1367-68, 1372-73 (describing Corps' deviations from Manual and
subsequent flooding of Management Area). The deviations began in 1993 and
ended in 2000, when the Corps resumed the release rates set forth in the original
1953 Clearwater Lake Water Control Manual. Id. at 1371.
28. Wildlife Management Area Details, ARK. GAME AND FISH COMM'N, http://

www.agfc.com/hunting/Pages/wmaDetails.aspx?show=170 (last visited Mar. 20,
2012) [hereinafter WMA Details] (discussing history, purpose and practices within
Management Area); see also Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1367 (delineating
characteristics of Management Area).
29. See Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1367 (characterizing Management
Area).
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hardwood timber resource and to attract migratory waterfowl for
recreational activities.3 0
The Commission manages the forest within the Management
Area in part to provide food essential to the migratory waterfowl's
diet.31 During the primary tree-growing season between April and
October, the water levels within the Management Area must be
minimal to prevent tree roots from weakening.3 2 To further promote tree growth and guide future tree management, the Commission selectively thins and clear-cuts existing trees, removes
undesirable species, and studies timber surveys conducted within
the Management Area.33
Clearwater Lake and Dam lie on the Black River in southeastern Missouri, approximately 115 miles north of the Management
Area. 3 4 The Corps completed the Clearwater Dam (Dam) in 1948,
and has since controlled the release of water from the Dam to regulate the Black River's water levels and reduce floods affecting the
30. WMA Details, supranote 28 (elaborating on history, purpose, and practices
within management area); see also Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States (Ark.
Game & Fish 1), 87 Fed. Cl. 594, 601 (Fed. Cl. 2009) (describing purpose of Management Area), rev'd, 637 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The Management Area contains a significant portion of the "remaining bottomland hardwood habitat in
eastern Arkansas," which includes tree species such as "nuttall oak, overcup oak,
pin oak[,] and water oak." WMA Details, supra note 28. The Management Area
"provide[s] top-quality waterfowl hunting[,] . . . [and] includes some of the finest
greentree reservoir duck habitat in Arkansas." Id. The migratory waterfowl found
in the Management Area depends upon the Commission's carefully maintained
hardwood and greentree areas during the winter migration months. Id. The Commission engages in "systematic harvests of mature oak and subsequent reforestation to maintain a healthy regenerating forest." Ark. Game and Fish I, 87 Fed. Cl. at
601.
31. Ark. Game & Fish I, 87 Fed. Cl. at 601 (explaining primary concerns of
Management Area). Maintaining the oak trees is particularly important because
they provide food for the migratory birds. Id. Each year the Commission artificially floods the Green Tree Reservoirs in the Management Area to attract migratory waterfowl and to provide an enhanced recreational opportunity for waterfowl
hunters. Id.
32. Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1369, 1372 (stating duration of tree growing season and describing effects of standing water on tree growth). "The presence of standing water or saturated soil during tree growing season can weaken the
roots of the multiple species of oak trees ... which can also render the oaks more
susceptible to drought conditions." Id. During the non-growing season, the Commission partakes in "seasonal flooding of about 7,000 acres of green timber to
attract waterfowl." WMA Details, supra note 28.
33. Ark. Game & Fish I, 87 Fed. Cl. at 602 (describing tree management
processes). Thinning the trees creates competition between the more mature
trees, allows sunlight to reach the younger trees and seedlings, and stimulates the
growth of non-wooded plants, which provide cover and food for wildlife. Id.
34. Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1367 (describing Clearwater Dam); see also
Ark. Game & Fish I, 87 Fed. Cl. at 602 (characterizing Clearwater Lake and Dam).
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agricultural lands along the river.35 Before the Manual was published in 1953, the release rates at Poplar Bluff, a water-level measuring gauge, were 12 feet during the tree-growing season and 14
feet during the non-growing season.3 6 The Corps noticed these
high releases adversely affected many downstream regions, and
thus experimented for several years with the water levels in the
Black River to mitigate such consequences.3 7 Finally, the Corps
published the Manual and set the maximum release level to 10.5
feet during the tree-growing season and 11.5 feet during the nongrowing season. 3 8

The Manual permitted deviations from the established maximum release rates for three purposes: emergencies; unplanned minor deviations such as construction or maintenance; and planned
deviations requested for agriculture, recreation or other purposes.3 9 In 1993, the Corps approved a planned deviation to lower
the maximum release level of the Dam to six feet for seventy-five
days "to 'allow farmers more time to harvest their crops." 40 In the
35. See Ark. Game & Fish I, 87 Fed. Cl. at 602 (chronicling history of Dam);
Flood Control Act of 1938, Pub.L. No. 75-761, 52 Stat. 1215, 1218 (1938) (providing fiscal allocations for flood management). In 1938, Congress passed the Flood
Control Act, "which approved flood control projects for regions of the country"
prone to damaging floods. Ark. Game & Fish I, 87 Fed. Cl. at 602. The Corps are
responsible for the operation of dams built as flood control projects. Id.
36. Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1368 (recounting historical water heights
at Clearwater Dam prior to publication of Manual). Poplar Bluff is located on the
Black River between the Dam and the Management Area, at which the maximum
water height of water is measured. Id.
37. Id. (describing Corps' experimentation with water release levels). Lower
water release rates yield a decreased flood level height and an increased flood
period duration, whereas higher water release rates yield an increased flood level
height and a decreased flood period duration. Id. While agricultural interests
favor a lower release rate, the Commission and residents located near Clearwater
Lake prefer a higher rate of release so water levels return to normal more quickly
after the initial release of water. Id.
38. Id. (describing process leading to publication of Manual). Before publishing the Manual, the Corps experimented with the water release levels by measuring "the maximum height of water at the Poplar Bluff Gauge in the Black River,"
located between the Dam and the Management Area. Id. at 1368. The Manual
states, "[T]he primary purpose of Clearwater Dam is to provide flood protection
below the dam and to maintain a permanent conservation pool for recreation, fish
and wildlife, and other incidental uses." Ark. Game & Fish I, 87 Fed. Cl. at 603
(quoting Clearwater Lake Manual).
39. Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1368 (outlining permitted deviations).
Any "planned deviations had to be approved by the Corps' Southwestern Division,
which was required to consider 'flood potential'" and any possible alternative measures. Id. (quoting Clearwater Lake Manual). Additionally, the Manual specified
that any requested deviations were to last only for limited periods of time. Id. at
1369.
40. Id. at 1369 (describing deviations at issue commencing in 1993). The
Corps approved a temporary deviation in 1993 to last from September 29, 1993 to
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same year, the Corps partnered with private parties and public
agencies to create the White River Ad Hoc Work Group (White
River Group), a group interested in regulating river water levels.4 1
The White River Group's purpose was "to propose permanent
changes to approved plans, including the Clearwater Lake Water
Control Manual." 42 The Commission, a member of the White River
Group, objected to any deviations lowering the maximum release
levels below the levels delineated in the Manual because such decreases would prolong the flooding in the Management Area.4 3
The White River Group could not recommend permanent revisions to the Manual's release plan after one year, and instead proposed an "interim operating plan" with scheduled temporary
deviations during an eight-month period.4 4 The Corps approved
the interim plan, which set the maximum water levels at 11.5 feet
for the first two weeks in April, 8 feet for the next four weeks, and 6
feet from mid-May until November. 45 Upon the conclusion of the
eight-month interim plan period, the White River Group again
could not propose permanent revisions to the Manual. 4 6 Accordingly, the Corps extended the interim operating plan for an additional twelve months. 47
In February 1996, the White River Group formed a Black River
subsidiary (Black River Group), which included the Commission, to
aid in creating a permanent release plan for the Dam.4 8 The Black
River Group was unable to develop a new plan, however, so the
Corps approved another interim deviation plan to last through
December 15, 1993, at which time "[n]o permanent change was made to the Water
Control Manual." Id.
41. Id. (describing formation of White River Group). Other participants in
the White River Group included: "private recreational, agricultural, navigation,
and hydropower interests, as well as state and federal agencies." Id.
42. Id. (alteration in original) (conveying White River Group's purpose).
43. Id. (noting Commission's participation in White River Group). The Commission disfavored lower release rates from the Dam because they would cause
consistent downstream flooding in the Management Area during the tree-growing
season. Id.
44. Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1369-70 (internal quotation marks omitted) (addressing deviations proposed by White River Group in 1994). The Management Area was concerned that the trees' roots would become over-saturated if a
lower release rate, and consequently prolonged period of flooding, occurred during the April to October tree-growing season. Id. at 1369.
45. Id. at 1370 (describing approved deviations).
46. Id. at 1369 (explaining White River Group's subsequent inability to propose final plan).
47. Id. at 1370 (stating Corps' extension of interim operating plan to April

1996).
48. Id. (describing formation of Black River Group).
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April of 1997.49 Thereafter, the 1953 Manual's release rates governed from April 1997 through November 1998 because no longterm interim plan was in place. 50 In September of 1998, the Black
River Group proposed a thirteen-month temporary deviation plan,
which the Corps approved, to last from December 1, 1998, until
December 31, 1999.51 This plan set the maximum water release
level at four feet from mid-May through November.5 2
The Corps prepared an Environmental Assessment in 1999 in
order to finally adopt a permanent revised release Manual for the
Dam.5 3 The Corps concurrently approved a continuation of the
1998-99 temporary deviations through December 1, 2000.54 In response to the need for an Environmental Impact Statement pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Corps
and Commission conducted tests in the Management Area to determine the environmental effects of various water release levels.5 5
The tests, however, confirmed the proposed plan's release rates
would flood tree roots. 5 6 Thus, the Corps halted its efforts to permanently revise the 1953 Manual and returned to the Manual's
49. Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1370 (describing 1996-1997 interim operating plan). The new interim operating plan "set the release rate at [six] feet in
June and at [five] feet from July through November." Id.
50. Id. (describing release rates from April 1997 to December 1998). The
Corps approved two planned temporary deviations from April 1997 through December 1998: one from June 3 to July 5, 1997, and another from June 11 to November 30, 1998. Id. These were approved to prevent possible flooding and
address a request from agricultural interests. Id.
51. Id. (describing 1998-1999 interim operating plan). The White River
Group disbanded in 1997, leaving the Black River Group to work on a final operating plan. Id. The Black River Group recommended a temporary deviation to begin on December 1, 1998 and last until December 31, 1999. Id. The temporary
deviation allowed maximum release levels to increase "if the lake behind Clearwater Dam filled to a certain volume." Id.
52. Id. (providing maximum release levels during 1998-1999 interim operating plan).
53. Id. (describing Corps' preparation for final release plan). "An [Environmental Assessment] is a brief report ... indicating possible environmental consequences that can help determine whether a more extensive Environmental Impact
Statement ("EIS") is necessary . . . ." Id. Due in part to the Commission's objections to a revised release plan, the Corps agreed an Environmental Impact Statement was necessary. Id.
54. Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1370-71 (describing extension, of 19981999 deviation plan). The Corps approved the extension as a "temporary Water
Control Plan." Id. at 1371.
55. Id. at 1370 (discussing requirements of Environmental Impact Statement). The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires an Environmental Impact Statement when "there is a possibility of significant environmental
impacts." Id.
56. Id. (stating water release level test results as conducted by Commission
and Corps). Flooded tree roots "could potentially damage or destroy the trees."
Id. at 1371.
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original release rate schedule.5 7 In 1999 and 2000, after six years of
flooding weakened the trees' roots, the region suffered a moderate
drought causing extensive timber mortality throughout the Management Area.58
In 2005, the Commission instituted an action against the
United States under the Tucker Act, claiming the Corps took a flowage easement over the Commission's property from 1993-2000 during the temporary release rate deviations.5 9 The Commission
alleged the Management Area experienced flooding regularly during the seven-year period; on average, flooding occurred 29 more
days per year during the interim deviation period, of which 8.5 days
were during the critical tree growth period.6 0 Moreover, the Commission attributed the extensive Management Area tree mortality to
the weakening of the trees' roots caused by the Corps' repeated
flooding. 6 1
The Commission sought just compensation for the alleged
flowage easement taken by the United States, the destroyed timber,
and the requisite regeneration costs to restore areas inundated by
invasions of new wetland vegetation.62 The United States argued
the increased flooding was intermittent and temporary, constituting
57. Id. at 1371 (describing Corps' reaction to test results).
58. Id. at 1373 (noting effects of drought). "The Commission's expert testifled that half of the damaged trees would die within five years and the living damaged trees were worth half of their original value." Id. Dr. James Baker, an
employee of Kingwood Forestry Services, characterized "the affected parts of the
Management Areas as 'a bottomland hardwood ecosystem in a state of collapse.'"
Ark. Game & Fish I, 87 Fed. Cl. 594, 610 (Fed. Cl. 2009). Dr. Baker concluded,
"Most of the nuttall oak, most of the red oaks were dead or dying. Many of the
white oaks were dead or dying. Most of the sweetgum were dead or dying." Id. He
further described "the change in the ecosystem as a transition from a 'riverine,
bottomland hardwood community' towards a 'headwater swamp' condition." Id.
59. Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1372 (stating Commission's cause of action against United States in response to Corps' actions); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491 (a) (1) (2011) (giving United States Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction
over claims founded upon Constitution and brought against the United States).
The Tucker Act permits various claims against the government, including claims
for damages arising under the Constitution, such as takings claims under the Fifth
Amendment. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a) (1) (2011). Claims brought under the Tucker
Act give exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims. Id.
60. Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1372-73 (describing flooding frequency in
Management Area). The Commission's experts testified the Management Area
flooded when the Corning water gauge, located downstream from the Poplar Bluff
gauge, measured over five feet. Id.
61. See id. at 1373 (discussing tree mortality within Management Area); see also
supra note 58 (giving more detailed synopsis of Management Area tree mortality).
62. Ark. Game & Fish I, 637 F.3d at 1372-73 (stating compensation sought by
Commission). The United States Court of Federal Claims awarded $5,602,329.56
in damages for the dead or dying timber and $176,428.34 in damages for regeneration costs. Id. at 1374.
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a tort rather than a taking.63 Additionally, the United States maintained the damage did not amount to a takings claim and the effects of the flooding were unpredictable. 6 4

III.

BACKGROUND

Varying analyses of potential takings under per se, physical, or

regulatory takings frameworks have resulted in diverse and complicated property takings jurisprudence. 65 The Fifth Amendment
states, "[NJo person shall be. . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." 66 The federal government's power to exercise eminent domain lies dormant in the legislature and can only be exercised on terms delegated in a statute
because this power is considered an "inherent attribute of
sovereignty."6 7

63. Id. at 1372 (noting United States' argument that flooding resulted in tort
claim, not taking claim).
64. Id. (expanding upon United States' argument). Ultimately, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed with the Department of Justice and determined the release deviations from the 1953 plan were temporary in nature and did
not amount to a taking-at most the deviations created tort liability. Id. at 137879. Thus, the Federal Circuit "reverseld] the Claims Court's decision that the

United States had taken a flowage easement on the Commission's land without just
compensation." Id. at 1379. On November 9, 2011, the Commission filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Ark. Game &
Fish Comm'n v. United States, No. 11-597, 2011 WL 5593237 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2011)
(seeking appeal). On March 1, 2012, the United States filed a brief in opposition
of the Commission's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v.
United States, No. 11-597, 2012 WL 691652 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2012) (responding to
Petition for Writ of Certiorari).
65. See Daniel L. Siegel & Robert Meltz, Temporary Takings: Settled Principlesand
Unresolved Questions, 11 VT. J. ENvTL. L. 479, 480 (2010) (describing uncertainties
of takings jurisprudence). Beyond core principles of takings jurisprudence, the
specific type of governmental action to result in a temporary taking is uncertain.
Id.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. V. (articulating takings clause).
67. See Eden Memorial Park Ass'n v. Superior Court In & For Los Angeles
Cnty., 11 Cal. Rptr. 189, 192 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (discussing derivation of

government's eminent domain power). Though there are no constitutional provisions which grant the government the power of eminent domain, the Fifth Amendment is an explicit limitation upon the government's sovereign right of
condemnation with just compensation. Id.
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The exercise of eminent domain can take on several forms.68
First, takings can be either physical or regulatory.6 9 Physical takings
are invariably qualified as per se takings; any physical occupation by
the government, no matter how minute the intrusion, requires just
compensation.70 Regulatory takings, on the other hand, require
more "complex factual assessments of the purposes and economic
effects of government actions" to determine compensation.7 1
The government generally has a right to acquire a flowage
easement over private property in return for just compensation
when a potential takings action involves flooding. 72 If the government fails to acquire a flowage easement and prolonged flooding
occurs on a landowner's property, the property owner may seek
compensation through inverse condemnation proceedings.7 3 The
Tucker Act permits aggrieved landowners to commence inverse
condemnation actions based on an alleged uncompensated taking
of property in the United States Court of Federal Claims.74
68. SeeJames H. Davenport & Craig Bell, Governmental Interference with the Use
of Water: When Do Unconstitutional "Takings" Occur?, 9 U. DENv. WATER L. REV. 1, 13
(2005) (describing division of "takings" cases into two distinct categories). In a
physical taking, "the government takes title to or physically occupies property." Id.
In a regulatory taking, the government regulates the use of property to an extent
that "deprives the owner of the economic use of the property." Id. at 14.
69. See id. at 13-14 (explaining difference between physical and regulatory
takings).
70. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1987) (citing
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)) (requiring
just compensation for any physical, permanent occupation by government). In
Loretto v. TeleprompterManhattan CATV Corp. (Loretto), government-permitted cable
facilities occupying 1.5 cubic feet of the landowner's property constituted a taking.
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 438.
71. See Davenport, supra note 68, at 14 (discussing regulatory takings analysis).
72. See generally Loesch v. United States, 645 F.2d 905, 920-22 (Ct. Cl. 1981)
(discussing Corps obtaining flowage easements from landowners through warranty
deed). "'[P]rivate property' for purposes of the Fifth Amendment ... includes
'property [that] has been dedicated by the State to public use."' Ark. Game & Fish
I, 87 Fed. Cl. 594, 616 (Fed. Cl. 2009) (defining private property). Thus, there is
no separate analysis for takings cases involving land taken by the federal government from a state government. Id. "[I]t is uncontested that the Commission, an
entity of the State of Arkansas, held a valid property interest in the Management
Area, including timber on that land, at the time of the alleged taking." Id.
73. See generally United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328-30 (1917) (explaining landowner retains fee in land subject to United States' easement to flood land
when floods are intermittent).
74. George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, § 12:14. Inverse condemnation actions, 1 PUB. NAT. RESOURCES L. 2ND ED. § 12:14 (2012) (summarizing inverse condemnation actions). Inverse condemnation proceedings typically arise
when government regulations result in a permanent or temporary taking of a landowner's property and the government has not paid just compensation for the alleged taking. Id. For a further discussion of the Tucker Act, see supra note 59 and
accompanying text.
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The line of takings cases concerning flooding and flowage
easements began in 1871, when the United States Supreme Court
held, "where real estate is [ ] invaded by superinduced additions of
water ... so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a
taking, within the meaning of the Constitution."7 5 Several years
later, the Court articulated various conditions necessary for a party
to recover under a Fifth Amendment takings claim.7 6 The Court
required the flooding result from government action and an appropriation of land amounting to more than a mere consequential
injury.77
In United States v. Dickinson (Dickinson),78 the Supreme Court
significantly altered the flooding takings jurisprudence.79 Congress
authorized the construction of a dam in South Charleston, South
Carolina, which later flooded the plaintiffs' land.8 0 Though the
landowners eventually reclaimed most of the land taken by the governmental flooding, it did not "change[ ] the fact that the land was
taken when it was taken and an obligation to pay for it then

75. Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co., 80 U.S. 166, 181 (1871)
(holding taking occurs when use of property is destroyed or impaired by superinduced additions of water). The Court's holding in Pumpelly narrowly applies to
situations where land is permanently flooded and all beneficial uses of the land are
effectively destroyed. Id. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines "superinduce"
as "to introduce as an addition over or above something already existing." MERRAM-WEBSTER, www.meriam-webster.com/dictionary/superinduce (last visited Jun.
6, 2012).
76. Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149-50 (1924) (holding flooding of plaintiffs property which would have occurred absent government-constructed dam was insufficient to justify takings claim).
77. See id. (articulating required elements of flowage easement taking claim).
"[I]n order to create an enforceable liability against the government, it is at least
necessary that the overflow be the direct result of the structure, and constitute an
actual, permanent invasion of the land, amounting to an appropriation of and not
merely an injury to the property." Id. at 149.
78. 331 U.S. 745 (1947) (holding intermittent flooding of land was compensable as taking under Fifth Amendment).
79. Id. at 751 (holding intermittent flooding of land above permanent flooding level was compensable by value of easements as assessed). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit later interpreted the Supreme Court's holding in
Dickinson to mean "property need not suffer an effectual destruction or a permanent and exclusive occupation by government runoff for a taking claim based on a
flowage easement." Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1358 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
80. Dickinson, 331 U.S. at 746-47 (stating facts of case). In addition to flooding plaintiffs' land, there was significant erosion "attributable to the improvement." Id. at 747.
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arose."8 1 The Court, therefore, held intermittent, temporary flooding compensable under the Fifth Amendment. 82
Several decades later, the United States Court of Claims defined the necessary duration of flooding to amount to a taking
under the Fifth Amendment in Fromme v. United States & Victoria
County Navigation District (Fromme).8 In Fromme, the Corps consistently flooded the plaintiffs land for three years during the construction of the Victoria Channel near the Gulf Intracoastal
Waterway in Texas. 84 Referencing the Supreme Court's holding in
United States v. Cress (Cress),86 the Fromme court reasoned the threeyear period of flooding "represented a temporary situation which
ceased to exist upon completion of the Victoria Channel."8 6 Therefore, floods not "inevitably recurring" are not compensable as physical takings under the Fifth Amendment.8 7
In Barnes v. United States (Barnes),88 the Court of Claims decided another case similar to Fromme.89 In Barnes, the court barred
the plaintiffs from recovering damages for flooding that occurred
before "the permanent character of intermittent flooding could
fairly be perceived."90 Though the intermittent water releases from
81. Id. at 751 (holding plaintiff's flooded property became part of river when
flooded by United States). Judgment was awarded to the plaintiffs for the government's taking of an easement for intermittent flooding. Id.
82. See id. at 751 (holding plaintiff was still entitled to relief despite reclaiming most land originally taken by government).
83. 412 F.2d 1192, 1196-97 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (holding one or two floods do not
constitute taking of permanent interest in affected land); see also United States v.
Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917) (holding there is no difference in kind between
permanent flooding and permanent liability to intermittent but inevitably recurring flooding).
84. Fromme, 412 F.2d at 1194-96 (stating facts of case).
85. 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
86. Fromme, 412 F.2d at 1196-97 (applying legal analysis to facts of case). The
temporary nature of the flooding, therefore, "lack[ed] the element of inevitably
recurring floodings which the Supreme Court stressed in holding that the Government had taken a flowage easement over the land involved in the Cress case [ ]."
Id. at 1197.
87. See id. at 1197 (stressing importance of inevitably recurring flood element
to takings claim).
88. 538 F.2d 865, 870 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (holding recovery for property takings is
unavailable before it is obvious releases and flooding would be permanent and
frequent). "Government-induced flooding not proved to be inevitably recurring
occupies the category of mere consequential injury, or tort. In such cases recovery
is not authorized in this court." Id.
89. For a further discussion of Fromme, see supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
90. Barnes, 538 F.2d at 873 (discussing facts of case). In Barnes, intermittent

releases of water from a dam damaged the crops. Id. The plaintiffs, however,
could not recover damages for flooding occurring between 1969 and 1973 because
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the dam caused four years of crop damage, the plaintiffs could only
recover for the damage sustained in the last year because the court
determined it was only at that point the flooding would inevitably
recur. 9 '
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided a case remarkably similar to Arkansas Game & Fish in 1987.92
In Cooper v. United States (Cooper)," the Corps constructed the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, which blocked part of the Tombigbee
River and caused over 200 acres of the plaintiffs farm to flood.94 A
five-year period of excessive flooding ensued, causing stress to the
farm's trees.9 5 By the time the Corps completed construction of the
Waterway, almost 50% of the trees on the 200-acre parcel died.96
As a result, the plaintiff sought compensation for a taking of the
timber destroyed by the flooding, not for a taking of a flowage easement.9 7 The Federal Circuit recognized many prior cases deemed
the destruction of property a compensable taking under the Fifth
Amendment; thus, the court held the plaintiff landowner was "entitled to compensation for the value of the timber destroyed."9 8
the character of the flooding was not perceived as inevitably recurring until 1973.
Id.
91. Id. (exploring facts and justifications of holding).
92. See Cooper v. United States, 827 F.2d 762, 762-63 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (relaying facts of case). Just as in Arkansas Game & Fish, the plaintiff in Cooper sought
compensation for the destruction of valuable timberland caused by excessive
flooding due to Corps activity on waterway. See id. at 763. For a detailed summary
of the facts in Arkansas Game & Fish, see supra notes 25-64 and accompanying text.
93. Cooper, 827 F.2d at 763-64 (holding flooding of plaintiffs land caused by
Corps waterway construction was compensable taking of timber under Fifth
Amendment).
94. Id. at 762 (describing events that resulted in flooding).
95. Id. (describing situation leading to mortality of trees).
96. Id. at 762-63 (describing mortality rate of trees).
97. Id. at 763 (describing procedural history of case). The trial court disagreed with the claim brought by the plaintiff and viewed the taking at issue as a
taking of a temporary flowage easement, not as a taking of trees. Id. Because the
landowner did not own the property when the Corps first took the flowage easement, the court held that Cooper was not entitled to compensation. Id.
98. Cooper, 827 F.2d at 764 (holding compensation is available for destroyed
property interest in lieu of appropriated land under temporary takings theory); see
also McDonald v. United States, 37 Fed.Cl. 110, 115 (Fed. Cl. 1997) (applying
Cooperand allowing compensation for value of timber taken by flooding independent of land appropriated by flood waters). The Federal Circuit recognized in
Cooper that "damages may be awarded under the Fifth Amendment for injuries
from a temporary taking where the same injuries would not be compensable if a
permanent taking had occurred." Cooper, 827 F.2d at 763. Thus, destruction of
property during a temporary taking could require just compensation even if a remedy for the destruction of the same property interest was not available had the
taking been of a permanent nature. See id.
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The Federal Circuit finally articulated a test distinguishing between potential physical takings and possible torts in 2003 when it
decided Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States (Ridge Line).99 In Ridge Line,
the plaintiff sued the federal government for the construction of a
United States Postal Service building uphill from the company's
property, which caused excessive drainage runoff onto its property. 0 0 Though the Federal Circuit acknowledged the lower
court's ruling that "no taking occurred due to permanent and exclusive physical occupation by the government," it classified the taking as a flowage easement by inverse condemnation. 101
To distinguish physical takings from torts, the Ridge Line court
developed a two-part test, consisting of a causation prong and an
appropriation prong.102 The causation prong requires the plaintiff
to demonstrate the government intentionally invaded the landowner's protected property interest, or the government's invasion
was the "direct, natural, or probable result of an authorized activity
and not the incidental or consequential injury inflicted by the action."103 The appropriation prong demands the government invasion "appropriate a benefit to the government at the expense of the
property owner, or at least preempt the owner's right to enjoy his

99. Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355-57 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(holding property need not suffer effectual destruction or permanent and exclusive occupation by government flooding for taking claim based on flowage easement). Ridge Line recognized, "Inverse condemnation law is tied to, and parallels,
tort law. Thus, not every invasion of private property resulting from government
activity amounts to an appropriation." Id. at 1355 (citation omitted) (quoting 9
PATRUcK J. RoHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 34.03[l1
(3d ed. 1980 & Supp. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. Ridge Line, Inc. 346 F.3d at 1351 (relaying facts of case). Ridge Line, Inc.
owned part of a hollow that captured storm water from Ridge Line, Inc. and the
Postal Service's property. Id. The construction of impervious surfaces on much of
the Postal Service's land caused a 70-150% increase in excess storm runoff. Id.
Ridge Line, Inc. built water detention facilities along the hollow to capture the
excess storm water, but the government refused to share in the cost of the construction. Id. Thus, Ridge Line, Inc. sought to recover the costs incurred in constructing the water detention facilities due to the influx of storm water originating
from the Postal Service's property. Id.
101. Id. at 1355 (analyzing trial court's decision). Ridge Line argued a twopart analysis was needed for inverse condemnation claims. Id. First, analysis under
takings law as opposed to tort law must be warranted by the facts of the case. Id.
Second, if a court finds a takings remedy is potentially available, the plaintiff must
show it has "a protectable property interest" in the property allegedly taken by the
government. Id.
102. Id. (describing two-part test).
103. Id. at 1355 (articulating first prong of test). The first prong requires
analysis of whether the invasion was the foreseeable and/or predictable result of
the government action. Id. at 1356.
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property for an extended period of time, rather than merely inflict
an injury that reduces its value."10 4
Recently, the Federal Circuit applied the Ridge Line test to several cases further clarifying whether the alleged governmental appropriation of land was compensable under a takings or torts
analysis.1 05 In Moden v. United States (Moden),106 the parties disagreed as to the interpretation of the Ridge Line causation prong.] 0 7
The government argued "the resulting injury must be foreseeable
from the authorized [ ] act," while the plaintiffs countered that the
"act need only be the 'cause-in-fact' of the resulting injury."10 8 The
Federal Circuit adhered to the government's interpretation and
stated that although "issues surrounding causation are [not] irrelevant," the plaintiff "must prove that the government should have
predicted or foreseen the resulting injury."1 0 9
The United States Court of Claims attempted to reconcile the
muddled history surrounding the torts versus takings jurisprudence
in Hansen v. United States (Hansen) 110 The court first recognized
the Federal Circuit's general takings analysis as a two-part prima
facie test requiring a relevant property interest and governmental
To distinguish between torts and
action that results in a taking.'
104. Id. at 1356 (articulating second prong of test). The second prong requires analysis of whether the government's interference "was substantial and frequent enough to rise to the level of a taking." Id. at 1357. Intermittent, but
inevitably recurring inundation is substantial and frequent enough to result in a
taking. Id. (quoting Barnes v. United States, 538 F.2d 865, 870 (Ct. Cl. 1976)).
105. See generally Moden v. United States, 404 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(holding environmental contamination of landowners' property was not direct,
natural, or probable result of government's use of trichloroethylene at Air Force
base); Cary v. United States, 552 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding fire
spread to landowners' property was not direct, natural, or probable result of U.S.
Forest Service's alteration of "fire ecology" in forest). "For an injury to be a compensable taking, the court must determine no break in the chain of causation existed between the suspected government authorized action and the injury." Cary,
552 F.3d at 1380.
106. 404 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
107. For a discussion of different interpretations of the Ridge Line causation
prong, see infra note 108 and accompanying text.
108. Moden, 404 F.3d at 1343 (describing parties' different interpretations of
Ridge Line test's first prong). "[T] he government's interpretation requires that the
injury was the likely result of the act, whereas the Modens' interpretation requires
only that the act was the likely cause of the injury." Id.
109. Id. (interpreting Ridge Line test's first prong).
110. Hansen v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 95-123 (Fed. Cl. 2005) (providing overview of tort-taking distinction). In Hansen, the landowner brought a takings action against the government alleging the Forest Service contaminated the
groundwater under his property by burying cans of pesticide on its own property.
Id. at 81.
111. Id. at 95 (explaining Federal Circuit's tort-taking distinction).
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takings, the court summarized the intent versus causation test developed in Ridge Line- first, a taking occurs if the plaintiff proves "the
government's subjective or specific intent to appropriate the
owner's property;" or, second, a taking occurs if the harm was proximately related to the government's actions through an objective
causation analysis. 11 2
The Court of Claims determined in Hansen that the Ridge Line
test resolved the tension between the two approaches to recovery
and thus harmonized decades worth of takings jurisprudence.' 13
Most importantly, the court expounded upon the Federal Circuit's
interpretation of foreseeability in Moden."' 4 The Court of Claims
decided, "instead of focusing on whether the harm should have
been foreseen," as the Moden court did, the correct interpretation
of Ridge Line would objectively focus on if the harm could be
foreseen.1 1 5
The Court of Claims additionally declared, "The real key to the
distinction between mere torts and takings by the government is
the substantiality of the harm, not the nature of the actions leading

112. Id. at 96 (articulating two distinctive approaches to tort-taking distinction). The causation approach method minimized the burden that an absolute
requirement of government intent for takings liability would have caused, because
the Fifth Amendment's takings clause does not have a state of mind requirement.
Id. at 97. "In [the objective causation] analysis, the need for proof of the government's intent was obviated; indeed, the causation analysis subsumed any showing
of subjective intent." Id. at 96.
113. Id. at 97, 116 (discussing importance of Ridge Line). The court recognized that the Federal Circuit summarized the tort-taking distinction test in Ridge
Line as occurring:
when the government intends to invade a protected property interest or
the asserted invasion is the 'direct, natural, or probable result of an authorized activity and not the incidental or consequential injury inflicted
'Second, the nature and magnitude of the governby the action.' ...
ment action must be considered.'
Id. at 117 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Ridge Line, Inc. v. United
States, 346 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). In Hansen, the court found it notable the
Federal Circuit "employed the disjunctive ('or') rather than the conjunctive ('and')
to relate the sub-parts of the first prong," because it meant intent or causation were
"each sufficient grounds upon which to predicate a takings claim." Id.
114. Id. at 97 (discussing Court of Federal Claim's misapplication of Ridge
Line test in Moden).
115. Hansen, 65 Fed. Cl. at 97 (discussing proper application of Ridge Line
test). The court explained that the Moden court "relied on a causation analysis to
determine whether a taking occurred," which should have triggered the inquiry as
to "whether it was objectively foreseeable that the government's actions could have
resulted in the alleged harm." Id. Rather, the Moden court decided there was no
taking because the government "had no reasonable cause to anticipate or foresee
the particular harm of which plaintiff complained." Id.
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to that harm."' 16 Judge Newman's dissent in Arkansas Game & Fish
echoed this notion when she declared "my colleagues err in ruling
that: 'we do not focus on a structure and its consequence. Rather
we must focus on whether the government flood control policy was
a permanent or temporary policy."' 1 17 Instead of focusing on the
nature of the cause of the damage, the Federal Circuit decided "the
location and permanence of the effect of the government action
causing the damage [] is the proper focus of the takings
analysis."1 18
B.

Destruction of Property as a Compensable Taking

The Supreme Court's decisions and several Federal Circuit decisions hold "the destruction of a property interest is a compensable taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment." 1 9 In
Murray v. United States,120 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) destroyed a couple's mortgage interest by refusing to let the couple
redeem the property, which the Federal Circuit deemed a compensable taking.1 21 The Federal Circuit relied upon this line of property destruction decisions in Cooper to hold a property owner is
entitled to compensation for the value of trees damaged by the government's flooding.122 The Federal Circuit further recognized
"damages may be awarded under the Fifth Amendment for injuries
from a temporary taking where the same injuries would not be compensable if a permanent taking had occurred."1 23 Essentially,
Cooper permits compensation for a property interest destroyed by
116. Id. at 101 (quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)) (articulating importance of substantiality of harm imposed by government). "It is the
character of the invasion, not the amount of damage resulting from it, so long as
the damage is substantial, that determines the question whether it is a taking." Id.
(quoting Causby, 328 U.S. at 266).
117. Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d 1366, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (dissenting
opinion) (emphasizing importance of finding permanent injury).
118. Id. at 1382-83 (quoting Owen v. United States, 851 F.2d 1404, 1412 (Fed.
Cir. 1988)) (requiring focus on effect rather than cause).
119. Cooper v. United States, 827 F.2d 762, 763 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (listing cases
that held destruction of property is compensable under Fifth Amendment).
120. 817 F.2d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
121. Id. (holding destruction of mortgage was compensable under Fifth
Amendment). "The Supreme Court has held that: '[t]he total destruction by the
Government of all value of [materialmen's] liens, which constitute compensable
property, has every possible element of a Fifth Amendment 'taking' and is not a
mere 'consequential incidence' of a valid regulatory measure."' Id. (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960)).
122. Cooper, 827 F.2d at 763 (discussing precedent which recognizes destruction of property interest as compensable taking under Fifth Amendment).
123. Id. (finding property interest injuries compensable under temporary taking, but not permanent taking).
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government action when such loss in value would not be compensable had the landowner received just compensation for the value of

the land permanently appropriated by the government. 124 Thus,
just compensation may be awarded for either the land appropriated
or the property interest destroyed. 12 5
IV.

NAlUTIvE ANALYSIS

In Arkansas Game & Fish, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit reviewed de novo whether the Commission asserted a valid
takings claim against the United States for the seven-year period of
26
intermittent flooding in the Commission's Management Area.1
The court narrowly interpreted the precedent and found the
Corps' interim deviations from the Manual inherently temporary
and unlikely to recur.' 2 7 Consequently, it found the deviations insufficient to constitute a temporary takings claim.128
The Federal Circuit focused primarily on the distinction between inherently temporary conditions and conditions that are permanent or certain to recur.129 The court determined temporary
conditions unlikely to recur result in a mere consequential injury
and give rise only to tort liability.1 30 Conversely, permanent condi124. See id. (discussing compensable property interest under temporary takings analysis). In a permanent taking by the government, the landowner receives
just compensation for the entire value of the land before the loss in value resulting
from the government action, which presumably includes the value of the property
interests located on the land. See generally United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369
(1943).
125. See Cooper, 827 F.2d at 763 (discussing remedies under takings claim).
Cooper permitted compensation solely for the property interest destroyed, not including the land upon which the property interest was situated. See id. For an
example of a more recent case that applied the holding of Cooper, see McDonald v.
United States, 37 Fed.C1. 110, 115 (Fed. Cl. 1997) (applying Cooper and allowing
compensation for value of timber taken by flooding independent of land appropriated by flood waters)
126. Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (evaluating
whether temporary deviations were compensable takings). The Commission instituted the claim under section 1491(a) (1) of the Tucker Act. Id. The Federal Circuit reviewed the lower court's legal analysis and conclusion de novo because
"determining whether a taking has occurred is a 'question of law based on factual
underpinnings.'" Id. at 1371 (quoting Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d
1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
127. Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1379 (holding temporary deviations were
not compensable takings).
128. Id. (determining deviations were more aligned with tort action than takings liability).
129. See id. at 1374-79 (analyzing distinction between permanent and temporary conditions).
130. See id. (distinguishing between permanent and temporary conditions in
finding only tort liability).
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tions and inevitably recurring intermittent conditions yield a takings claim. 13 '

A.

General Distinctions Between Torts and Takings

The court began its analysis by declaring, "In general, if particular government action would constitute a taking when permanently continued, temporary action of the same nature may lead to
a temporary takings claim."' 3 2 Takings cases involving flooding and
flowage easements, however, are inherently different from other
types of takings claims.' 3 3 Though it is difficult to distinguish between torts and takings with respect to flooding cases, only permanent or intermittent but inevitably recurring floods give rise to
takings liability.134
The Federal Circuit cited several cases that distinguished between floods causing a permanent physical occupation of land and
floods causing a temporary invasion and consequential damage to
the land.' 35 Specifically, the court analyzed the Supreme Court's
holdings in Cress and Dickinson, both of which emphasized the permanent nature of the condition causing the flooding. 3 6 In Cress,
the Court applied a takings analysis and awarded compensation due
to the permanence of the underlying condition even though it
caused only intermittent flooding on the landowner's property.' 3 7
Additionally, the Court determined there was "no difference of
kind ... between a permanent condition of continual overflow ...
and a permanent liability to intermittent but inevitably recurring
131. See id. at 1375-77 (differentiating between tort and takings claims for deciding damages).
132. Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1374 (citing First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 328 (1987))
(holding just compensation must be paid for period during which taking was
effective).
133. Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1375 (articulating differences between
flooding takings claims and other types of takings claims).
134. Id. (analyzing difficulties in distinguishing between flooding takings
claims and other takings claims). An invasion is permanent only when there is
"permanent condition of continual overflow or a permanent liability to intermittent but inevitably recurring overflows." Id. at 1374 (quoting United States v.
Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
135. Id. at 1375 (explaining difference between permanent physical occupations and temporary invasions). In Loretto, the Supreme Court summarized various
cases that "distinguished between invasions that were permanent or temporary in
character." Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428
(1982).
136. Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1375 (discussing Supreme Court's holdings in Cress and Dickinson regarding permanent conditions necessary for takings
damages).
137. Id. (analyzing Cress holding).
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overflows."' 38 The Federal Circuit also favorably analyzed the Supreme Court's holding in Dickinson.'3 9 Though the landowner in
Dickinson eventually reclaimed most of his land, the "nature of the
government's action remained permanent."140 Thus, the Supreme
Court awarded just compensation to the plaintiff landowner in Dickinson for the "land [that] was taken [in the first place]. *"141 Finally,
the Federal Circuit acknowledged several Court of Claims decisions
determining "inherently temporary conditions cannot result in the
taking of a flowage easement" if they will not inevitably recur.142
B.

Distinguishing Ridge Line

The Federal Circuit belabored the distinction between the case
at bar and its prior decision in Ridge Line.14 3 The court explained
Ridge Line "involved a permanent condition-runoff," which inherently led to the inevitably recurring flooding conditions that sufficiently constituted a takings claim. 144 In Arkansas Game & Fish,
however, the Federal Circuit decided it was important to determine
whether the condition leading to the intermittent flooding was permanent, not whether the flooding itself was permanent. 145
Next, the Federal Circuit recognized Ridge Line requires courts
to distinguish between a tort and a taking. 146 To do this, courts
must determine whether the nature of the government's action justifies a takings remedy and whether the action predictably caused
the harm.14 7 The court, however, found this analysis unnecessary
in Arkansas Game & Fish because the Corps' deviations "were by
138. Id. (quoting United States v. Cress, 243 U.S 316, 328 (1917)) (holding
there is no difference in kind between permanent overflows and intermittent, yet
inevitably recurring, overflows).
139. Id. at 1376 (analyzing Dickinson).
140. Id. (discussing Dickinson holding).
141. Ark. Game & Fish I, 637 F.3d at 1376 (articulating Dickinson holding).
142. Id. (discussing Court of Claims' prior holdings); e.g., Barnes v. United
States, 538 F.2d 865, 870 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Nat'l By Products, Inc. v. United States,
405 F.2d 1256, 1273 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Fromme v. United States, 412 F.2d 1192, 1197
(Ct. Cl. 1969)).
143. Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1375-78 (distinguishing case from Ridge
Line). One of the Commission's main arguments was the Federal Circuit's Ridge
Line decision found temporary flowage easements sufficient to constitute a takings
claim. Id. at 1375.
144. Id. at 1375-76 (differentiating Ridge Line).
145. Id. at 1376 (holding condition causing intermittent flooding must be
permanent). Only when the condition leading to the intermittent flooding is permanent can the flooding be inevitably recurring. Id.
146. Id. at 1376 (explaining Ridge Line's requirements).
147. Id. (discussing Ridge Line's requirements).
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their very nature temporary and, therefore, cannot be 'inevitably
48

recurring. "1

C. Temporary Versus Permanent Actions
The Federal Circuit analyzed the differentiating aspects between permanent and temporary conditions in Arkansas Game &
Fish.149 The court recognized permanent structures and improvements typically cause overflows in government-induced flooding
cases, leading to permanent flooding conditions. 5 0 To distinguish
this decision from prior cases, the court noted it must determine
whether the decision to release water from a dam, an action not
necessarily permanent, is "by its nature temporary [or] permanent."115 The court concluded the government's deviations from
its flood control policy were by their very nature "ad hoc or temporary" and could not be inevitably recurring.15 2
The court dismissed the Commission's argument that the deviations were only temporary because the "Corps eventually stopped
[the] deviation[ ] ."165 The Commission believed, regardless of
whether the Corps reverted back to the original release rates, that
the Corps "appropriated a temporary flowage easement for which it
must pay."154 Nonetheless, the court maintained that because the
Corps designed the governmental action to be temporary from the
start and the Corps never approved the deviations as a permanent
policy, the deviations were undisputedly temporary.' 5 5
148. Ark. Game & Fish I, 637 F.3d at 1376 (stating application of Ridge Line
test is unnecessary when action is by its very nature temporary).
149. Id. at 1376-77 (articulating difference between permanent and temporary conditions). The Federal Circuit stated, "Permanent conditions often, but not
always, yield inevitably recurring flooding." Id. at 1377.
150. Id. (discussing typical cause of flooding in government flooding-induced
takings cases).
151. Id. at 1377 (applying temporary versus permanent analysis).
152. Id. (determining Corps' interim deviations were "by their very nature"
temporary). The Corps' deviations from the Water Control Plan were temporary
in nature because the Corps never adopted them as permanent revisions to the
Plan. Id. at 1370-71.
153. Ark. Game & Fish I, 637 F.3d at 1377 (describing Commission's theory).
The Commission claimed "the United States abandoned its easement, [which
made] the taking temporary." Id. Thus, the Commission believed the Corps' decision to stop the deviations was the only characteristic rendering the deviations temporary. See generally id.
154. Id. (outlining Commission's argument).
155. Id. (explaining inherently temporary nature of deviations by virtue of
Corps' failure to adopt them into permanent policy). The Corps would have had
to comply with federal regulations, including drafting Environmental Assessments
and Environmental Impact Statements, in order for the deviations to become permanent policy. Id. at 1370, 1378. But the Corps never enacted a permanent pol-
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To further support its holding, the court narrowly interpreted
two Court of Claims cases finding no compensable taking in circumstances similar to Arkansas Game & Fish.15 6 The Federal Circuit
first discussed Barnes, in which the Court of Claims awarded compensation to the landowner only when it was clear "the permanent
character of intermittent flooding could fairly be perceived."1 5 7
Next, the Federal Circuit analyzed Fromme, in which the Court of
Claims refused to find a taking "because the spoil bank only 'represented a temporary situation.'" 5 8 The Federal Circuit relied upon
these cases to further emphasize the importance of the permanence of the situation leading to the flooding. 15 9
In conclusion, the Federal Circuit categorized the deviations
from the 1953 Manual as a temporary situation and declared "l[t] he
actions at most created tort liability." 6 0 As the "deviations in question were plainly temporary and the Corps eventually reverted to
the permanent plan," the court resolved the "releases [could not]
be characterized as inevitably recurring."' 6 ' Thus, the Federal Circuit held the federal government did not take a flowage easement
over the Commission's land necessitating just compensation.16 2
D.

Federal Circuit's Dissent

CircuitJudge Pauline Newman issued a strong dissent, arguing
any superinduced addition of water that destroys or impairs a property's usefulness "is a taking within the meaning of the Constitution."163 Judge Newman did not interpret the precedent to require
a constant or permanent flooding.

64

Rather, she found a court

icy, which further alluded to the temporary nature of the Corps' actions. Id. at
1377.
156. Id. at 1378 (analyzing Court of Claims' reasoning in Barnes and Fromme).
157. Id. at 1378 (addressing Court of Claim's holding in Barnes that intermittent flooding must permanently recur to constitute a taking).
158. Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1378 (indicating Federal Circuit's interpretation of Fromme).
159. Id. (reconciling Barnes and Fromme). The court reasoned, "[B]oth Barnes
and Fromme indicate that flooding must be a permanent or inevitably recurring
condition, rather than an inherently temporary situation, to constitute the taking
of a flowage easement." Id.
160. Id. at 1379 (analyzing deviations from 1953 Manual).
161. Id. (holding Corps did not take temporary flowage easement over Commission's Management Area).
162. Id. (relying on inherently temporary nature of Corps' deviations from
Water Manual's release rate plans).
163. Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1380-81 (Newman,J., dissenting) (claiming majority "depart[ed] from constitutional[ly] right and well-established precedent" by holding taking had not occurred).
164. Id. (stating constitutional grounds for takings claim).
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must consider the specific facts of the case to conclude whether a
temporary taking or a mere consequential injury occurred.' 6 5
The dissent analyzed the precedent to conclude "flood-induced destruction of timber is a permanent injury, compensable by
the Fifth Amendment."' 6 6 Relying partly on Cooper, the dissent believed the majority erred by "incorrectly holding that the issue is
solely whether the injurious flooding was eventually ended."16 7 According to the dissent, the majority focused too narrowly on
whether the flooding was of permanent duration, and not sufficiently on whether the damage caused by the flooding was
permanent.168

V.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit veered from the
Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence and failed to apply the
Ridge Line test to the facts of Arkansas Game & Fish.16 9 Though the
Federal Circuit varies in applying the Ridge Line test and considers
different factors as most important in inverse condemnation analyses, the Federal Circuit misconstrued Fromme to reach its holding in
165. Id. at 1381 (analyzing precedent). Precedent established that the eventual abatement of flooding does not preclude a landowner's entitlement to just
compensation. Id. Moreover, precedent does not hold floods that are short in
duration, produce minimal or temporary damage, or confer a benefit upon the
plaintiff amount to a taking. Id. at 1381-82.
166. Id. at 1382 (concluding property destruction is compensable under the
Fifth Amendment after analyzing facts of Cooper). In Cooper, river blockage due to
the Corps' construction along a waterway caused prolonged periods of flooding on
the plaintiff's property during a five-year period. Cooper v. United States, 827 F.2d
762, 762 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Although the flooding in Cooperwas not permanent, the
Court of Federal Claims in Arkansas Game & Fish I stated, "the temporary taking of
a flowage easement resulted in a permanent taking of timber." Ark. Game & Fish
I, 87 Fed.Cl. 594, 624 (Fed. Cl. 2009).
167. Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1382 (Newman,J., dissenting) (analyzing
majority's holding). The majority focused on "whether the government flood control policy was a permanent or temporary policy." Id. at 1377 (majority opinion).
The dissent considered the majority's view of the Fifth Amendment to be incorrect; rather than focus on the location of the damage's cause, the dissent thought
the focus should be on the location and permanence of the effect of the government's action. Id. at 1382 (Newman, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 1383 (Newman, J., dissenting) (stating majority's focus on permanence of cause of flooding was too narrow). Though the majority recognized the
possibility of recovery under a temporary takings scenario, it ignored its own reasoning by holding temporary deviations could not constitute a taking because they
would not inevitably recur. Id. at 1376 (majority opinion). The dissent, however,
believed the Federal Circuit's holding "contradicts the entire body of precedent
relating to the application of the Fifth Amendment to government-induced flooding." Id. at 1382 (Newman, J., dissenting).
169. For a summary of case law applying the Ridge Line test, see supranotes 99118 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol23/iss2/2

24

Carter: Flooding the Possibility of Recovery under a Temporary Takings An

2012]

FLOODING THE POSSIBILITY OF RECOVERY

235

Arkansas Game & Fish.17 0 Moreover, the court disregarded decades
of Fifth Amendment takings precedent by narrowly holding the
condition leading to the flooding must be permanent to qualify as a
taking. 171
A.

Intermittent Flooding Is Sufficient

A taking, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, occurs
when government-induced flooding destroys or impairs the usefulness of property. 7 2 Prior decisions require neither constant nor
permanent flooding, and do not hold that the eventual abatement
of flooding negates recovery under the Fifth Amendment.17 3 Yet,
the Federal Circuit in Arkansas Game & Fish misinterpreted Fromme
and "held that flooding damage is never compensable if the flooding is eventually stopped, whatever the injury."17 4 The Federal Circuit's indication that flooding must be a permanent or inevitably
recurring condition conflicts with Fromme, which provides there is
"not a per se rule against taking if the flooding is eventually
stopped.""7 5 Rather, Fromme illustrates "the traditional balance that
characterizes takings decisions" with a focus on the frequency and
duration of the intermittent flooding and the likelihood of future
recurring flooding.1 76
By limiting the issue in a temporary takings analysis to
"whether the injurious flooding was eventually ended," the Federal
170. See Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1382 (Newman, J., dissenting) (analyzing misapplication of Fromme holding).
171. For a discussion of takings precedent with respect to temporary takings
by superinduced additions of water, see supranotes 72-104 and accompanying text.
172. Ark. Game &Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1381 (Newman,J., dissenting) (synthesizing precedent).
173. Id. (listing cases where intermittent flooding or abatement of flooding
were still compensable under Fifth Amendment). See generally United States v.
Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947) (finding taking even where plaintiff recovered
much of flooded land); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) (holding intermittent but recurring flooding was compensable under Fifth Amendment); Ridge
Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding compensable
taking even though property owner constructed water detention facilities to abate
flooding); Cooper v. United States, 827 F.2d 762 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding taking
remedied by Corps after five years was still compensable under Fifth Amendment);
Barnes v. United States, 538 F.2d 865 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (holding intermittent flooding
which damaged crops constituted taking).
174. Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1382 (Newman, J., dissenting) (explaining majority's misapplication of Fromme).
175. Id. at 1382 (discussing majority's conflicting interpretation of Fromme).
176. See id. (providing correct interpretation of Fromme); see also Fromme v.
United States, 412 F.2d 1192, 1196-97 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (discussing court's holding).
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Circuit failed to correctly apply the Ridge Line test.17 7 Although the
majority recognized the existence of temporary takings, it discarded
its pertinence. 178 The majority concluded no taking of any kind
occurred in Arkansas Game &Fish because of the seemingly temporary nature of the deviations from the Manual's approved water release rates.1 79 This contradicts the court's recognition of the
availability of recovery under a temporary takings scenario.18 0
Thus, the Federal Circuit ignored decades of precedent permitting
redress for a flowage easement and the resulting property damage
under a temporary takings analysis.1 8 '
B.

Avoiding Application of Ridge Line Test

The Federal Circuit failed to properly apply the Ridge Line test
because of its unwillingness to look beyond whether the injurious
flooding eventually ended.18 2 Rather than focusing solely on the
temporary or permanent nature of the deviations from the Manual,
the Federal Circuit should have focused on the government's intent
and the substantiality of the injuries suffered.18 3 Most notably, the
Federal Circuit avoided applying the Ridge Line test by determining
"the deviations were by their very nature temporary and, therefore,
177. Ark. Game &Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1382 (Newman, J., dissenting) (analyzing
faults in majority's holding).
178. Id. (discussing majority's mistake in deciding case).
179. Id. at 1383 (explaining Corps' temporary deviations from Water Control
Manual could not constitute taking of flowage easement). The Federal Circuit
concluded "the deviations were by their very nature temporary and, therefore, cannot be 'inevitably recurring' or constitute the taking of a flowage easement." Id. at
1376 (majority opinion). The dissent, however, argues the majority disregarded
the purpose of a temporary taking, which is to redress temporary takings situations. Id. at 1383 (Newman, J., dissenting).
180. See id. at 1374 (majority opinion) (stating possibility of recovery under
temporary takings analysis). The majority recognized "if particular government
action would constitute a taking when permanently continued, temporary action
of the same nature may lead to a temporary takings claim." Id. In reference to
Ridge Line, the majority admitted the "permanent destruction or exclusive occupation by government runoff is not always required for a successful taking ....
[T]he 'occupation' need not be exclusive and the destruction need not be 'permanent.'" Id.
181. For a summary of precedential cases holding that temporary takings are
compensable under the Fifth Amendment, see supra notes 72-104 and accompanying text.
182. Ark. Game & Fish I, 637 F.3d at 1382 (Newman, J., dissenting) (characterizing majority's analysis as incorrect). The majority focused only "on whether
the government flood control policy was a permanent or temporary policy." Id. at
1377 (majority opinion).
183. See Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (outlining two-prong inquiry into whether injury is compensable under tort
or takings analysis).
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[could not] be 'inevitably recurring' to constitute the taking of a
flowage easement." 184 Similar to the Court of Federal Claims in
Ridge Line, the Federal Circuit in Arkansas Game & Fish "[f] ocus [ed]
exclusively on whether the plaintiff suffered 'a permanent and exclusive occupation" and "did not consider .

.

. that the defendant

had appropriated a 'flowage easement by inverse condemnation.' "185
Prior case law indicates "a permanent occupation need not be
exclusive or continuous," and "restoration of the plaintiff's property
[does] not preclude a finding of liability."18 6 If the Federal Circuit
correctly applied the Ridge Line test in Arkansas Game & Fish, it
would have determined the Corps' deviations from the Manual
were not temporary solely because they were eventually abandoned.1 8 7 The court would have arguably found the Corps would
continue to deviate from the Manual's release rates without the
Commission's alert of the adverse effects of the increased flooding.18 Although the Management Area was not permanently inundated by water, Dickinson previously concluded a permanent and
exclusive occupation by government runoff unnecessary for a takings claim.' 8 9
The Federal Circuit would have discovered the factual scenario
in Arkansas Game & Fish passed both prongs of the test if it had
properly applied the Ridge Line test.o9 0 Regarding the causation
184. Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1376 (rationalizing decision to not apply
Ridge Line test).
185. See id. (emphasizing temporary nature of deviations); see also Hansen v.
United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 116 (Fed. Cl. 2005) (summarizing court's procedure
in Ridge Line).
186. Hansen, 65 Fed. Cl. at 116-17 (analyzing Ridge Line decision). See also
Loretto v. Telemprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436-38 (1982)
(stating permanent occupation need not be exclusive or continuous).
187. See Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1371 (explaining rationale for Corps'
abandonment of altered release rates).
188. See Ark. Game & Fish I, 87 Fed. Cl. 594, 622-23 (Fed. Cl. 2009) (discussing Commission's repeated attempts to warn Corps of adverse effects of flooding).
The Corps was on notice as early as 1996 that the repeated floods threatened the
well-being of the Management Area. Id. It was not until 2001, however, that the
Corps ceased the deviations. Id.
189. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751 (1947) (holding eventual
reclamation of property after flooding recedes does not bar recovery under temporary takings analysis).
190. See Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (articulating both prongs of Ridge Line test). The first prong considers
whether the government intends to invade a particular property interest; if not,
whether the alleged invasion was the direct, natural, or probable result of the government's action. Id. The second prong examines the nature and magnitude of
the government action by determining whether the government appropriated a
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prong, the Corps did not intentionally flood the Management Area
with superinduced additions of water. 19 1 Thus, the court should
have continued its analysis to determine whether the excess Management Area flooding was a foreseeable result of the Corps' deviations from the Manual. 19 2 As articulated by Hansen, the proper
foreseeability analysis considers whether the negative effects of the
government activity could be foreseen, not whether they should be
foreseen.1 93
Through experiments or further research, the Corps could
have foreseen the excess flooding caused by the releases from the
Dam; in fact, "the Corps had available to it a computerized modeling system." 194 No intervening cause disrupted the chain of causation to effectuate the timber mortality because the hardwood trees
had already suffered severe damage prior to the summer droughts
of 1999 and 2000.195 Moreover, members of the Commission repeatedly warned the Corps that the continuous deviations caused
excessive flooding in the Management Area. 196 As such, the flooding in the Management Area was a likely result of the increased flow
of water from the Clearwater Dam. 9 7
benefit from the invasion or whether the property owner was preempted from the
right to enjoy the property for an extended period of time. Id.
191. See Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1367-68 (explaining purpose of
Corps' deviations from Clearwater Dam's flood release rates).
192. For a further discussion of the foreseeability aspect of the Ridge Line
test's causation prong, see supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.
193. For a further explanation of the Hansen court's interpretation of the
Ridge Line causation prong, see supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.
194. Ark. Game & Fish I, 87 Fed. Cl. 594, 623 (Fed. Cl. 2009) (summarizing
facts of case). "[T]he Corps had available to it a computerized modeling system
that could have been used to evaluate potential hydrological effects of its deviation
from the water control plan .

. .

. [T]he effect of deviations in the Management

Area was predictable, using readily available resources and hydrologic skills." Id.
195. See Cary v. United States, 552 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding
injury may not be foreseeable if intervening event breaks chain of causation). "For
an injury to be a compensable taking, the court must determine that no break in
the chain of causation existed between the suspected government authorized action and the injury." Id. at 1380. "The reverse is [not] true, that an injury foreseeable necessarily is without a break in the chain of causation. Foreseeability and
causation are separate elements that must be shown." Id.
196. Ark. Game & Fish I, 87 Fed. Cl. at 622-23 (discussing Commission's repeated attempts to warn Corps of excessive flooding).
197. Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(articulating causation prong of Ridge Line test). When the government does not
intend to invade the property interest, the test for the causation prong is whether
the invasion "is the direct, natural, or probable result of the authorized activity,
and not the incidental or consequential injury inflicted by the action." Id. For a
further explanation of the Ridge Line test, see supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
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The facts in Arkansas Game & Fish also satisfy the appropriation
prong of the Ridge Line test.19 8 The nature and magnitude of the
Corps' taking within the Management Area qualifies as "great" due
to the excessive timber mortality throughout the Management Area
over the seven-year period of flooding.1 9 9 The sustained timber
mortality during this flooding period will severely hinder the Management Area's recreational benefits as the native timber species
die and the waterfowl cease to visit the area. 2 0 0 Though the flooding in the Management Area did not appropriate a direct benefit to
the Corps, the damage will likely impede recreationalists' use of the
Management Area, as the decreased vegetation will attract less migratory waterfowl during the winter months. 201
The Commission's repeated attempts to alert the Corps of the
danger the excess water posed to the Management Area's delicate
ecosystem highlights the magnitude of the taking. 202 As early as
1996, the Commission warned the Corps the increased flows "were
damaging the bottomland hardwoods." 203 The Commission also
stressed "the deviations from the authorized plan of operation of

198. Ridge Line, Inc., 346 F.3d at 1356 (outlining appropriation prong of Ridge
Line test). The appropriation prong of the Ridge Line test must consider the nature
and magnitude of the government action. Id. "An invasion must appropriate a
benefit to the government at the expense of the property owner, or at least preempt the owner[']s right to enjoy his property for an extended period of time,
rather than merely inflict an injury that reduces it value." Id.
199. For a further summary of the excessive timber mortality and invasion of
new wetland vegetation, see supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
200. SeeArk. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (describing
excessive timber mortality).
201. Ark. Game & Fish I, 87 Fed. Cl. 594, 601 (Fed. Cl. 2009) (explaining
chief concern of Commission's habitat coordinator is managing forests to provide
food and hard mast essential for migratory birds). It is likely that the migratory
waterfowl, prized by both the Management Area and the recreational sportsmen
who hunt in the Management Area, will cease to visit the area absent the hardwood
trees necessary for the birds' diet and reproductive habitat. Id. During the flooding period, the Commission's regenerative logging efforts were expensive and inefficient due to "the dead and declining timber [that] was distributed irregularly
throughout the Management Area." Id. at 620.
202. Id. at 623 (articulating Commission's repeated warnings to Corps); see
also AGFC Considers Appeal in Dave DonaldsonBlack River WMA Case, Loc CABIN DEMOCRAT (Apr. 10, 2011), http://thecabin.net/sports/outdoors/2011-04-10/agfcconsiders-appeal-dave-donaldson-black-river-wma-case#.Tp8EyZz6YVE
(predicting
possible Commission appeal of Federal Circuit ruling). "By the late 1990s ... the
Corps of Engineers had been repeatedly warned by members of the Commission
that the ongoing deviations were causing flooding in the Management Area." Ark.
Game & Fish I, 87 Fed. Cl. at 623.
203. Ark. Game & Fish I, 87 Fed. Cl. at 622 (noting Commission's attempts to
warn Corps of damage to hardwoods due to increased flooding).
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Clearwater Lake w[ere] the direct cause of the growing season
flooding and incurred damages on the [Management Area]."204
The facts of Arkansas Game & Fish also satisfy the preemption
formulation of the appropriation prong.2 0 5 The substantial and frequent flooding rose to the level of a taking because it occurred
every year during the growing season, so long as the Corps deviated
from Manual. 206 Despite the fact that the flooding eventually
ceased and the Commission reclaimed its land, the Supreme Court
previously concluded such termination does not bar recovery under
a takings claim.20 7
C.

Destruction of Property as a Taking

As articulated by the Federal Circuit in Cooper, an alternative
means to determine whether governmental activity constitutes a
taking is to look specifically at the destruction of the property interest.208 In fact, several Supreme Court cases found the destruction
of a property interest during a temporary taking compensable
under the Fifth Amendment. 209 The government in Arkansas Game
& Fish argued the Commission "waived its claim for [a] flowage
easement" by asserting timber "was the only property interest claim
204. See id. (discussing Commission's communications with Corps regarding
flooding within Management Area).
205. See Cary v. United States, 552 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (describing preemption formulation of appropriation prong). "To meet this preemption
formulation of the appropriation prong, the complaint must allege that 'the government's interference with any property rights of [the landowners] was substantial and frequent enough to rise to the level of a taking.'" Id. (quoting Ridge Line,
Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
206. Id. at 1381 (explaining substantial and frequent aspect of test). "In the
flooding cases, appropriation means that the water stays on the property indefinitely, or predictably returns - a permanent invasion." Id. Though the flooding at
issue in Arkansas Game & Fish will not predictably return, during the seven-year
deviation period the flooding predictably returned each growing season while the
Corps continued to deviate from the Water Control Manual. Ark. Game & Fish II,
637 F.3d 1366, 1369-71 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The invasion of water was not permanent
because it receded each year, but it was by no means an isolated situation "such as
one or two floodings, [which] do not make a taking. ... . Repeated invasions of the
same type have often been held to result in an involuntary servitude." Ridge Line,
Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Eyherabide v.
United States, 345 F.2d 565, 569 (1965)).
207. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751 (1947) (stating reclamation
of property does not bar takings claim).
208. Cooper v. United States, 827 F.2d 762, 763 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating destruction of property interest is compensable taking within meaning of Fifth
Amendment). "Cooper had a property interest in the timber when the taking of
the timber became complete. . . . [Thus,] he is entitled to compensation for the
value of the timber destroyed." Id. at 764.
209. For a further synopsis of the destruction of property interests compensable under the Fifth Amendment, see supra notes 119-124 and accompanying text.
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ever identified;" however, the court regarded this distinction as
immaterial. 2 10
The majority in Arkansas Game & Fish ignored the distinction
between property destruction and flowage easements. 2 11 Instead, it
focused solely on the flowage easement analysis and failed to apply
the Federal Circuit's prior holding in Cooper.2 12 Specifically, the
Federal Circuit distinguished Cooper from Arkansas Game & Fish by
pointing out the plaintiff in Cooper requested compensation for lost
timber, not for a flowage easement.2 13 This analysis is erroneous
because the taking of timber and the taking of a temporary flowage
easement are inherently intertwined.2 1 4 The government's appropriation of the flowage easement resulted in the loss of timber;
thus, compensation for the taking of timber is appropriate even
though such compensation would not be awarded if a permanent
appropriation of property occurred.2 15 The Federal Circuit should
have performed a more thorough analysis of Cooper in relation to
the facts at hand and accordingly found the government appropriated a taking of the Management Area. 216

210. See Ark. Game & Fish I, 87 Fed. Cl. 594, 617-18 (Fed. Cl. 2009) (analyzing
impact of Federal Circuit's decision in Cooper in guiding Commission's focus on
timber takings). Although the temporary flowage easement over the Commission's property "was the underlying progenitor" of the floods, "superinduced additions of water and a resulting temporary flowage easement have always been
embedded within the Commission's claim for the taking of its timber." Id. at 618.
211. Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d 1366, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (mentioning Cooper briefly). The only deference the Federal Circuit
majority paid to its previous holding in Cooperwas a mention in a string cite discussing that eventual abatement of flooding does not preclude entitlement to just compensation. Id.
212. See id. (describing Federal Circuit's failure to apply Cooper to Arkansas

Game & Fish).
213. Id. at 1378 n.7 (majority opinion) (stating Cooper is not analogous to Ar-

kansas Game & Fish). The Federal Circuit found Cooper did not govern because
plaintiff only sought compensation for the lost timber, not for the government's
appropriation of a temporary flowage easement. Id. Thus, the Federal Circuit
held that application of Cooper was inappropriate to the facts at hand because the
Commission sought compensation under a taking of a flowage easement analysis.

Id.
214. See Cooper v. United States, 827 F.2d 762, 762-64 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(describing remedies available under takings analysis).
215. Id. at 753 (outlining compensation for injuries suffered under temporary
taking versus permanent taking). For a further discussion of the relationship between compensation for a property interest lost during a temporary taking versus
compensation for a permanent taking, see supra notes 119-124.
216. See Cooper, 827 F.2d at 753 (holding where remedy under takings analysis
is unavailable, remedy for destruction of property may be appropriate).
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IMPACT

Some theorists characterize property rights as a "bundle of
sticks," in which landowners have the exclusive control over the use
of their property.21 7 The power to exclude another from one's
land remains a treasured right, and consequently, an appropriation
of one's land is "perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an
owner's property interests."2 18 Particularly in the case of a wildlife
management area, a private owner or a state's right to exclude
others can mean the difference between the life and death of wildlife and ecological resources. 2 19 Moreover, after the inundation by
water and appropriation of property, collection of just compensation must occur to effectively restore the biological diversity destroyed or impaired by the government's taking. 220
In light of these concerns, the Federal Circuit's misguided
holding in Arkansas Game & Fish is alarming for three reasons.22 1
First, the court completely ignored the longstanding precedent establishing the possibility of recovery under a temporary takings
analysis. 22 2 Second, it failed to apply the well-established Ridge Line
torts versus takings test previously used in similar cases. 22 3 Third,
the Federal Circuit failed to consider the destroyed timber on the
property as a destruction of property, for which prior precedent has
held compensable under the Fifth Amendment.2 2 4

217. Thomas Grey, The Disintegrationof Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY
69-71 (J.Pennock &J. Chapman eds., 1980) (describing property rights as sticks in
bundle). "Legal restraints on the free use of one's property are conceived as departures from an ideal conception of full ownership." Id.
218. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435
(1982) (describing effect of property appropriation on land owner). "[T]he government does not simply take a single 'strand' from the 'bundle' of property
rights: it chops through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand." Id. (quoting
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979)).
219. For a summary of the death of timber within the Dave Donaldson Wildlife Management Area as a result of Corps-induced excessive flooding, see supra
notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
220. For a further explanation of regeneration costs, see supra note 62 and
accompanying text.
221. For a further discussion of these three reasons, see infra notes 222-224
and accompanying text.
222. For a further outline of precedential cases awarding just compensation
under a temporary takings analysis, see supra notes 75-104 and accompanying text.
223. For a further summary of the Ridge Line torts versus takings analysis and
cases that successfully applied it, see supra notes 99-118 and accompanying text.
224. For a further explanation of the compensability of destroyed property
under the Fifth Amendment, see supra notes 119-125 and accompanying text.
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Federal Circuit Ignores Possibility of Compensation Under a
Temporary Takings Claim

The Federal Circuit originally acknowledged "particular government action would constitute a taking when permanently continued, [and] temporary action of the same nature may lead to a
temporary takings claim," but it failed to apply this logic to Arkansas
Game & Fish.225 Rather, the court focused too narrowly upon the
permanence of the condition leading to the intermittent flood-

ing. 2 2 6 Therefore, the court misinterpreted the binding precedent
holding the "'effect of the government action causing the damage
[ ] is the proper focus of the taking analysis.'"227
By incorrectly analyzing whether Arkansas Game & Fish qualified as a temporary taking, the Federal Circuit barred itself from
applying the subsequent Ridge Line test.2 28 The court's misguided
and narrow classification of the facts placed the case into a nontaking category. 229 Subsequently, the court analyzed the case no
further.230

The Federal Circuit's limited concentration on the cause of the
appropriation, rather than the actual property interest appropriated, will have a detrimental impact on future litigants bringing takings claims against the government.2 3 1 Such a misconstrued
analysis impedes litigants with an affected property interest harmed
by a temporary government action. 232 The court's reasoning completely ignores the precedent allowing compensation for a tempo225. Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 328 (1987)). For a further summary of both the Supreme Court and Federal
Circuit's recognition of compensation under a temporary takings theory, see supra
notes 75-82 and accompanying text and supra notes 132-142 and accompanying
text.
226. See Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1382-83 (quoting Owen v. United
States, 851 F.2d 1404, 1412 (Fed. Cir. 1988)) (holding erosion caused below high
water mark due to excessive flooding constituted compensable taking). For a further discussion of the proper focus under a takings analysis, see supra notes 116118 and accompanying text.
227. See Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d at 1382-83 (quoting Owen, 851 F.2d at
1412) (defining proper focus under takings analysis).
228. For a further examination of the court's narrow classification of the facts
as a non-taking case, see supra notes 143-168 and accompanying text.
229. For a description of the court's classification, see supranotes 159-162 and
accompanying text.
230. For further explanation of the court's absence of analysis, see supra notes
182-207.
231. For a further discussion of the court's narrow focus on the cause of the
appropriation, see supra notes 172-181 and accompanying text.
232. For a summary of the analytical differences between the cause of appropriation and the property interests being appropriated, see supra notes 172-181.
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rary taking under the Fifth Amendment so long as the property was
appropriated during the specified period.2 3 3
B.

Court's Failure to Apply Ridge Line Test

Had the court given more deference to precedent, it would
have recognized Arkansas Game & Fish was ripe for analysis under
the Ridge Line test.2 3 4 Application of the Ridge Line test would have
resolved the court's uncertainty by guiding it through a more detailed analysis of the facts at hand. 2 3 5 The Federal Circuit itself developed the Ridge Line test to distinguish between situations where
compensation was appropriate under a tort or temporary takings
analysis; therefore, it is perplexing the court chose not to analyze
this case under the guidance of Ridge Line merely because the condition causing the intermittent flooding in Arkansas Game & Fish
was temporary.2 3 6
The court's decision not to apply the Ridge Line test will have
potentially negative consequences for future litigants in cases similar to Arkansas Game & Fish. 37 This holding will especially affect
cases in which the main issue is whether the government action is a
tort or a taking.23 8 A hasty judicial decision to classify a case as a
non-taking situation before applying the Ridge Line analysis may bar
deserving litigants from receiving just compensation in future temporary takings claims.23 9

233. For a further explanation of intermittent flooding temporary takings, see
supra notes 172-181 and accompanying text.
234. For a further analysis of the Ridge Line test, see supra notes 99-118 and
accompanying text. For a further discussion of the analysis the court would have
applied had it employed the Ridge Line test, see supra notes 182-207 and accompanying text.
235. For a further prediction of the decision the court should have reached
had it applied the Ridge Line test, see supra notes 182-207 and accompanying text.
236. For a further outline of the reasons the court chose not to apply the
Ridge Line test, see supra notes 143-148.
237. For a further description of the possible negative effects on future litigants, see supra notes 225-233 and accompanying text.
238. For a further explanation of the analytical difference between torts and
takings, see supra notes 99-118, 132-142 and accompanying text.
239. For a further discussion of application of the Ridge Line test, see supra
notes 143-148.
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Failure to Recognize the Destruction of Property as
Compensable Under the Fifth Amendment

Lastly, the Federal Circuit ignored its own precedent when it
forwent utilizing the Cooper analysis in Arkansas Game & Fish.2 4 0
The Federal Circuit erroneously determined Cooper was inapplicable because the Commission sued the Corps seeking compensation
for a temporary flowage easement, not compensation for the destruction of the damaged timber.2 4 1 This was another oversight by
the Federal Circuit, as Cooper clearly established the distinction between compensation for a flowage easement and for damaged prop24 2
erty is unnecessary because the two are closely related.

The Federal Circuit's narrow and misguided holding in Arkansas Game & Fish unsettles the extensive and diverse flowage easement takings precedent.2 4 3 Moreover, it inevitably hinders litigants
with a temporary takings allegation from prevailing against the government.2 4 4 The court gave the government unprecedented power
to occupy private property without just compensation and emphasized the federal government's apparent disregard for the environmental destruction caused by such a taking. 245 The Corpsapproved seven-year period of repeated flooding severely damaged
the Dave Donaldson Black River Wildlife Management Area's several thousand acres of hardwood trees, inevitably impaired the
area's biodiversity, and diverted the prized migratory waterfowl
away from the Management Area. 246 The Federal Circuit's failure
to justly compensate the Commission under a temporary takings

240. For a further summary of the Federal Circuit's treatment of Cooper, see
supra notes 208-215 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 208-215 (analyzing majority's treatment of Cooper).
242. For a further discussion of the unnecessary distinction between a flowage
easement and destruction of property, see supra notes 211-215 and accompanying
text.
243. See Ark. Game & Fish II, 637 F.3d 1366, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, J. dissenting) (explaining deficiencies in majority's holding). The dissent
reasoned that the majority's "ruling contradicts the entire body of precedent relating to the application of the Fifth Amendment to government-induced flooding."
Id. at 1383.
244. For a further explanation of the difficulties future litigants will have
under the majority's holding in Arkansas Game &Fish, see supra notes 221-233 and
accompanying text.
245. For a further analysis of the environmental repercussions of the Corps'
action, see supra notes 25-61 and accompanying text.
246. For a further description of the damaged hardwood trees within the
Management Area, see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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theory for the Corps' rash water management practices is both an
ecological and constitutional tragedy. 24 7
Magdalene Carter
247. For a further summary of the constitutional and environmental implications of the majority's decision, see supra notes 217-246 and accompanying text.
* J.D.. Candidate, 2013, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., 2010, Middlebury College.
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